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PUT ON YOUR COAT, A CHILL WIND BLOWS: EMBRACING
THE ExPANSION OF THE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
FACTOR IN TENTH CIRCUIT FIRST AMENDMENT
RETALIATION CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
"The First Amendment is the bedrock of American Democracy."'
Protection of the First Amendment in the public employment context is
paramount to the livelihood of a thriving democracy. Government em-
ployees must have the opportunity to speak publicly about their employer
without the fear of undue retaliation.
In the recent Tenth Circuit cases of Baca v. Sklar2 and Maestas v.
Segura,3 the court resolved two First Amendment retaliation claims
brought by public employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 First Amendment
retaliation claims arise when a government employer takes some undue
adverse employment action against a public employee after he or she
speaks on a matter which concerns the public at large.5 Within these two
cases, the court displayed its tendency toward utilizing a broader stan-
dard of reviewing detrimental actions which employers take against their
employees. However, the court did not explicitly define its standard for
interpreting the adverse employment action factor.
6
In the past, the court has refused to restrict the analysis of the ad-
verse employment action factor to its counterpart in Title VII7 retaliation
claims. In these claims, an employee who is retaliated against for oppos-
ing employment discrimination or filing a charge of discrimination must
prove that the employer's retaliation manifested itself in the form of an
ultimate employment decision such as termination or demotion. 8 Con-
versely, the court has also refused to adhere to the broadest interpreta-
tion, that any action which tends to chill an employee's free speech is
adverse.
9
1. Kary Love, First Amendment Law: Free Speech Rights of Public Employees: A Natural
Resource for Democracy, MICH. B. J., June 2005, at 28, 29.
2. 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005).
3. 416 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2005).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
5. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
6. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1220-2 1; Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1188.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2005).
8. § 2000e-3(a) (2005); See Nancy Landis Caplinger & Diana S. Worth, Vengeance is Not
Mine: A Survey of the Law of Title VII Retaliation, 73 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 20, 21 (Apr. 2004).
9. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1188 n.5.
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This article is a survey of the Baca and Maestas cases wherein the
court decided not to assert a position in the circuit split of adverse em-
ployment action interpretation in First Amendment retaliation claims.
Instead, the court chose to "leave that question for another day."' 0 How-
ever, both cases lay the foundation for a discussion of First Amendment
retaliation, the circuit split regarding the adverse employment action fac-
tor of the claim, and how the Tenth Circuit should now embrace the
broad "chilling effect" interpretation of adverse employment actions.
Part I of this article provides the foundation for First Amendment
retaliation claim jurisprudence. Part II analyzes the circuit split, includ-
ing the various circuit court interpretations of adverse employment ac-
tions: strict Title VII adherence, the "individual of ordinary firmness"
model, and the "chilling effect" standard. Part III discusses the facts and
merits of the Tenth Circuit Baca and Maestas cases. Finally, in Part IV
the author argues that the Tenth Circuit should now embrace the "chill-
ing effect" interpretation of adverse employment actions in First
Amendment retaliation claims. By joining the circuits which utilize the
"chilling effect" approach to the adverse employment action factor, the
Tenth Circuit will further protect public employees from employers who
punish them for exposing issues which are a matter of public interest.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIMS
Generally, the constitutional rights of public employees are pro-
tected under § 1983." Among other claims, this statute gives a public
employee the right to file suit against a government employer for violat-
ing the employee's constitutional right(s).' 2 The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law .... 13
Section 1983 gives public employees a clear advantage over private em-
ployees because it provides a cause of action for claims outside the scope
of Title VII, such as a First Amendment retaliation.' 4 First Amendment
retaliation claims typically arise when an employee speaks out against
the employer and suffers some detrimental action as a result.' 5
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. John R. Williams, Public Employment Litigation Under Section 1983, 715 PRACTISING L.
INST. 441,443 (2004).
15. DAVID L. HUDSON, BALANCING ACT: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND FREE SPEECH 31 (2002).
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The Supreme Court has held that a "public employee does not relin-
quish its First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public inter-
est by virtue of government employment."' 6 A series of monumental
Supreme Court cases established the criteria for First Amendment re-
taliation claims. Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education'7 in
1968, the Court created a balancing test weighing the rights of an em-
ployee to comment on matters of public concern with the rights of an
employer "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees. ' 8 Following Pickering, in Mount Healthy City
School District v. Doyle,' 9 the Supreme Court enumerated a two part test
requiring that the employee's speech be a substantial motivating factor
for the adverse action taken against him or her.20 Finally, the Supreme
Court concentrated its attention on what constitutes public concern.2' In
Connick v. Myers,22 the Court held that as a matter of law the employee's
speech must involve public issues in order for the employee to have a
cognizable claim.
23
For a First Amendment retaliation claim to prevail in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, an employee must establish that "(1) the speech involved a matter of
public concern, (2) the employee's interest in engaging in the speech
outweighed the employer's interest in regulating the speech, and (3) the
speech was a 'substantial motivating factor' behind the employer's deci-
sion to take an adverse employment action against the employee., 24 If an
employee meets these criteria, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
that he would have acted in the same manner regardless of the em-
ployee's protected speech.
Each element leaves room for discussion and analysis. Through
Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and Connick, the Supreme Court set boundaries
within which the lower Federal courts must operate. But within those
guidelines there is room for interpretation.26 Each circuit has created its
own criteria for the public concern and the employee-employer Pickering
balancing test.27 However, the subject of this article is narrowly drawn
to the third factor: what constitutes an adverse employment action.
There is a split among the circuits regarding interpretation of this factor,
16. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
17. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
18. Id.
19. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
20. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283-84.
21. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-48.
22. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
23. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title Vii's Adverse Action Requirement on
First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government Employee Speech, 79
TuL. L. REv. 669, 694 (2005) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 145).
24. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005).
25. Id.
26. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687.
27. See generally William Herbert, The First Amendment and Public Sector Labor Relations,
19 LAB. LAW. 325, 337-40 (2004).
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resulting in three approaches: Title VII adherence, the "individual of
ordinary firmness" model, and the "chilling effect" standard.
II. THE SPLIT-HIGH PRESSURE, MODERATE ATMOSPHERE, AND A
CHILLY FRONT
In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the "adverse employment ac-
tion" of a First Amendment retaliation claim in Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois.28 This case blasted the "chilling" wind through the cir-
cuits. 29 In a footnote interpreted as mere dicta by its adversaries, the
Court adhered to the Seventh Circuit's assertion that "even an act of re-
taliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public em-
ployee ... when intended to punish her for exercising her free speech"
was an adverse employment action.3° In light of Rutan, the circuit courts
have struggled to define "adverse employment action" in First Amend-
ment retaliation claims.
The range of interpretation spans from the confines of Title VII to
the "chilling effect" mentioned in Rutan. The Eleventh, Eighth, and
Fifth Circuits utilize the structure of Title VII retaliation adverse em-
ployment actions, holding that only "materially adverse change[s] in the
terms or conditions of employment" are actionable. 3' Additionally, there
is the reasonable person of adverse employment actions, the "individual
of ordinary firmness," as categorized by the Second, Third, Sixth, and
D.C. Circuits.32 However, the Seventh, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits have
consistently held that any action that is likely to chill the exercise of free
speech is cognizable. 33 The following subsections provide an explana-
tion of each standard and how each of the circuit courts are applying the
three applications of adverse employment actions in First Amendment
retaliation claims.
A. High Pressure Likely-Title VI Adherence
To assert a successful First Amendment retaliation claim, the public
employee must allege that "an adverse personnel action resulted from the
protected activity. 34 The Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits consis-
tently borrow Title VII "adverse employment action" interpretation and
apply it to First Amendment retaliation claims. 35 These circuit courts
adopt a narrow approach, holding that only those actions which "demon-
28. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
29. Id. at 76.
30. Id. at 76 n.8 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 954 n.4 (7th Cir.
1989)). For an interpretation of Rutan 's footnote eight as "non-controlling dicta" see Lybrook v. Bd.
of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1340 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000).
31. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687.
32. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir. 2004).
33. Love, supra note 1, at 31.
34. Herbert, supra note 27, at 341.
35. Levinson, supra note 23, at 692; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e- 17 (2005).
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strate a 'materially adverse' or 'tangible' job action" are recognizable
under the third prong of the First Amendment claim.36
In order to prevent discrimination, Title VII prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees because of their race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin. 37 Included in Title VII is an anti-retaliation
provision which states that employers cannot discriminate against em-
ployees who have "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.,
38
In order to prove discriminatory retaliation the employee must meet
a three part prima facie test.39 The employee must establish: "(1) pro-
tected opposition to Title VII discrimination or participation in a Title
VII proceeding, (2) adverse action by the employer subsequent to or con-
temporaneous with such employee activity, and (3) causal connection
between such activity and the employer's adverse action. ' 4° If all three
elements are met, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that he or
she had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the adverse action
taken against the employee.41
The Eleventh Circuit adheres to the Title VII standard by enumerat-
ing several key employment decisions as adverse actions. These actions
include "discharges, demotions, refusals to hire or promote, and repri-
mands. ' '42 Although the court previously used the "chilling" effect lan-
guage, it consistently utilizes the Title VII standard for interpreting ad-
verse actions in First Amendment retaliation claims.43 In Stavropoulos v.
Firestone,44 the public university employee was subject to a memo criti-
cizing her, the compilation of a file which consisted of faculty letters
criticizing the employee, and the encouraging of other faculty members
at the university to state negative things about her in an employment re-
view.45 Cumulatively, these actions led to an initial faculty vote not to
36. Levinson, supra note 23, at 689.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2005).
38. Id. at § 2000e-3(a).
39. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
40. Caplinger & Worth, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Pastran v. K-Mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1201,
1205 (10th Cir. 2000)).
41. Id.
42. Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 619.
43. Id. The Stavropoulos court stated:
Requiring the First Amendment retaliation claimant to show that the action she complains
of not only was likely to chill her speech but also altered an important condition of em-
ployment insures that she satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of federal justiciability
law... Show[ing] that the action had an impact on an important aspect of her employ-
ment.
Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 620 (emphasis added).
44. 361 F.3d 610 (1 th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1850 (2005).
45. Id. at 620.
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renew the employee's university contract.46 The court held that "taken
together or separately, Firestone's acts fail to rise to the level of an ad-
verse employment action because they had no impact on an important
condition of Stavropoulos's job, such as her salary, title, position, or job
duties."47
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit adheres to the Title VII demand for
material or tangible adverse actions for an employee to have a cognizable
First Amendment retaliation claim.48 In Meyers v. Starke,49 Ms. Meyers
was a monitor of children in state custody who made placement and ther-
apy decisions for the children.50 Shortly after a disagreement with co-
workers about a regimen of treatment for two children and testifying
against the treatment in a court proceeding, Ms. Meyers was transferred
to another department.5 Ms. Meyers resigned her position and filed a
First Amendment retaliation claim, alleging she was demoted to a posi-
tion that did not entail a full workload. 52 Relying on precedent, the court
held that an adverse employment action must be "exhibited by a material
employment disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits or respon-
sibilities. 53 The court found that Ms. Meyer's transfer did not rise to the
level of an adverse employment action and therefore she did not have a
cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983.
54
Finally, the Fifth Circuit applies a slightly modified Title VII ad-
verse employment action standard. While the court does not require an
"ultimate employment decision," it repeatedly adheres to the same stan-
dard enumerated by the Eleventh Circuit.55 The court has refused to ex-
pand the First Amendment retaliation adverse employment action prong
to those acts which are trivial in nature.5 6 For instance, in Foley v. Uni-
versity of Houston System, 57 the court denied a professor's First Amend-
ment retaliation claim in part because she failed to demonstrate that she
46. Id. at 613.
47. Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
48. Levinson, supra note 23, at 690.
49. 420 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
50. Meyers, 420 F.3d at 738.
51. Id. at 740.
52. Id. at 741,744.
53. Id. at 744 (quoting Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2002)). See also
Fischer v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122
F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997). "Other Eighth Circuit cases similarly discuss the need to show
significant alteration in the conditions of employment or 'a material change in the terms and condi-
tions of employment' in order to establish a First Amendment violation." Levinson, supra note 23,
at 691.
54. Meyers, 420 F.3d at 744.
55. Levinson, supra note 23, at 689-90.
56. See Terrence S. Welch, A Primer on Texas Public Employment Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV.
981,991 (2004).
57. 355 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003).
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suffered an adverse employment action.58 The court relied on the prece-
dent of Harrington v. Harris59 in its determination.60
In Harrington, the court rejected the "chilling effect" interpretation,
holding that "actions such as 'decisions concerning teaching assign-
ments, pay increases, administrative matters, and departmental proce-
dures,' while extremely important... do not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional deprivation.",6' The court held that those actions which merely
chill protected speech are not actionable.62 This explicit rejection was
accompanied by language consistently used in Title VII retaliation
claims: "[a]dverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refus-
als to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands. 63
While the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth circuits apply the Title VII
"material" adverse employment action standard, several circuit courts
have shied away from the strict standard.64 These circuits have adopted a
compromise of interpretation in First Amendment retaliation claims.
B. Gray Skies of Moderation-The Individual of Ordinary Firmness
The Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits established the great
compromise of First Amendment retaliation claims through the "individ-
ual of ordinary firmness" standard. 65 This "sensible standard," as articu-
lated by the D.C. Circuit, is implicated when the acts against the em-
ployee "would chill or silence a 'person of ordinary firmness' from fu-
ture First Amendment activities. 66
In 2005, the Second Circuit stated in Burkybile v. Board of Educa-
tion67 that it would continue to apply the "individual of ordinary firm-
ness" standard and reiterated that "an adverse employment action is one
that 'would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness
from exercising his or her constitutional rights.' '6 8  The employee in
Burkybile was subject to the threat of suspension and possible termina-
58. Foley, 355 F.3d at 341.
59. 118 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 1997).
60. Foley, 355 F.3d at 342.
61. Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
64. Levinson, supra note 23, at 697-98.
65. See Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ., 411 F.3d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 2005); Farmer v. Cleveland
Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2002); Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir.
2000); Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
66. Love, supra note 1, at 31 (citing Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 826).
67. 411 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2005).
68. Burkybile, 411 F.3d at 313 (quoting Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310,
320 (2d Cir. 2004)). In Washington, the employee was threatened with administrative proceedings
and a thirty-day suspension without pay which the court determined could deter individuals within
the police department from speaking out against discrimination practices and polices. Washington,
373 F.3d at 320.
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tion as a result of a disciplinary hearing.69 The court determined that the
looming consequences of the hearing, as well as the inconvenience of
litigation costs were "clearly deterrents for even a person of ordinary
firmness. 7 °
Similarly, the Third and Sixth Circuits have fashioned their own
"individual of ordinary firmness" standards. In Suppan v. Dadonna,
7
1
the Third Circuit recognized that the strength of the First Amendment
would be diluted if "harassment for exercising the right of free speech
was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordi-
nary firmness from that exercise .... ,,72 Mirroring Suppan, the Sixth
Circuit in Farmer v. Cleveland Public Power73 held that First Amend-
ment retaliation claims require "that the defendant's adverse action
caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that [constitutionally
protected] activity. 74 In Farmer, the employee was subject to reduction
in supervisory, management, and policy-making tasks.75 The court found
that these changes, though not materially adverse to her employment
status, were enough to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercis-
ing her free speech rights.76
These cases establish a precedent of compromise among the circuits
and lay the foundation for a fact-based inquiry which does not rely on a
strict enumeration of materially adverse actions, but respects the serious
nature of First Amendment claims. They utilize the "chilling" effect but
remain wary of allowing any deterrents to be actionable.77 While the
Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits hold a compromising interpreta-
tion of "adverse employment actions," several circuits have adopted a
broad understanding of the third prong of First Amendment retaliation
claims.
C. Grab A Coat, It's Chilly Out There-The "Chilling Effect"
The Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits consistently hold that less
severe actions which deter or "chill" speech are adverse in First Amend-
ment retaliation claims.78 Within these circuits, "adverse actions need
not be great where First Amendment rights are involved to allow public
69. Burkybile, 411 F.3d at 314.
70. Id.
71. 203 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2000).
72. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235 (citing Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)).
73. 295 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002).
74. Farmer, 295 F.3d at 602 (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235.
78. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2003); Power v. Summers,
226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337,
352 (4th Cir. 2000).
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employees to proceed with a retaliation case., 79 Any detrimental action
against a public employee need not be significant but must chill, ever so
slightly, the employee from exercising his or her right to speak in the
future.80
In Coszalter v. City of Salem,81 the Ninth Circuit stated that the goal
of First Amendment retaliation claims is to "prevent, or redress, actions
by a government employer that 'chill the exercise of protected' First
Amendment rights." 82 In Coszalter, the employee was transferred to new
and sometimes unpleasant job duties, subjected to several unwarranted
disciplinary investigations, and placed on two reviews of work product
quality for his public disclosure of information about health and safety
standards in the City's public works department.83 The court determined
that these actions were adverse and also held that "various kinds of em-
ployment actions may have an impermissible chilling effect .
[whereby] even minor acts of retaliation can infringe on an employee's
First Amendment rights. 80 Thus, the threshold in Ninth Circuit adverse
employment claims is minimal deterrence of an employee's First
Amendment rights.
The Seventh Circuit is the Federal court system's greatest proponent
of a broad interpretation of adverse employment actions in First
Amendment retaliation claims. In fact, the Seventh Circuit "does not
buy into the idea that adverse employment action is a necessary element
of a First amendment case in the public employment context." 86 Accord-
ing to Judge Posner, "any deprivation under color of law that is likely to
deter the exercise of free speech, whether by an employee or anyone else,
is actionable. 87
The Seventh Circuit holds that a constitutionally-based retaliation
claim is not comparable to federal employment discrimination statutes
because in constitutional claims, any deterrence of the exercise of free
speech is actionable. 88 In Spiegla v. Major Eddie Hull,89 the court held
that a transfer to more physically demanding job which required less skill
and a change in schedule constituted an adverse employment action.90
The court specifically stated that a "§ 1983 case does not require an ad-
79. Love, supra note 1, at 31.
80. Section 1983 First Amendment Claims, 5 EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 1:16
(2005).
81. 320 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2003).
82. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 974-75.
83. Id. at 970-72.
84. Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
85. Id. See also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Scrib-
ner, 812 F.2d 426, 435 n.17 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. Williams, supra note 14, at 457.
87. Power, 226 F.3d at 820 (emphasis added).
88. Spiegla v. Major Eddie Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir. 2004).
89. 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004).
90. Spiegla, 371 F.3d at 928.
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verse employment action within the meaning of the antidiscrimination
statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ''91
Finally, the Fourth Circuit also adheres to the "chilling effect" stan-
dard for adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims. To establish retaliation an employee must prove "that he was
deprived of a valuable government benefit or adversely effected in a
manner that, at the very least, would tend to chill his exercise of First
Amendment rights. 92 In the Fourth Circuit the public employee does
not have to show that the action was the equivalent of a dismissal.93
These three circuits embrace the notion that any action which deters
or chills an employee from exercising his or her constitutional right to
free speech is sufficiently recognizable as an adverse employment action.
Where "[m]ore subtle forms of punishment are available" to an em-
ployer, the Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits will readily stand guard
against the chilling adverse actions.
94
III. BACA AND MAESTAS
The Tenth Circuit currently wavers in its interpretation of adverse
employment actions in First Amendment retaliation claims. In Baca and
Maestas the Tenth Circuit again refused to choose an approach for inter-
preting adverse employment actions within the circuit.
A. Baca v. Sklar
95
1. Case
In Baca, Peter Baca alleged that David Sklar and the University of
New Mexico had discriminated against him based on ethnicity and retali-
ated against him for "exercising his First Amendment rights. 96  The
defendants removed to federal district court and moved for summary
judgment. 97 The district court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment holding that Baca had failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his statements had motivated the defendant to
take adverse actions against him.98
Baca began employment with the University of New Mexico in
March 2001 in the Center for Injury Prevention Research and Education
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 352 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). See also Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 246 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 356 (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995)).
94. Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (And Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REv. 939, 971 (2001).
95. 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005).
96. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1210, 1215.
97. Id. at 1215.
98. Id. at 1216.
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(CIPRE). 99 Shortly thereafter Baca encountered a series of discrepancies
in university funding and hiring practices.' 00 Baca reported this informa-
tion to his supervisor, Sklar.'0 ' A few weeks later Baca again raised the
issue to Sklar and his assistant. 1
02
Shortly thereafter, two employees began directly communicating
with Sklar, which allegedly usurped Baca's supervisory role.10 3 In June
2001 Baca met with university human resources and attorneys to discuss
the funding and hiring concerns.' 4 From then on Baca faced several
irregularities on the job, including employee transfers from his depart-
ment which resulted in large budget cuts and a reprimand from Sklar
about his attitude. 0 5 Additionally, and without deference to human re-
sources protocol, Sklar sent Baca a letter reprimanding him for a vacancy
announcement he had published. 1
06
Baca suffered through an unfounded employee investigation after
which Sklar demanded his resignation, which Baca refused to tender.
0 7
In early 2002, a mediation was scheduled where, after some dispute,
Baca agreed to resign.
0 8
2. Decision
The court applied the following test to determine whether the uni-
versity's action against Baca constituted a prima facie First Amendment
retaliation violation:109 whether:
(1) the speech in question involves a matter of public concern; (2) his
interest in engaging in the speech outweighs the government em-
ployer's interest in regulating it; and (3) that the speech was a sub-
stantial motivating factor behind the government's decision to take
an adverse employment action against the employee."l
0
The court determined that Baca's statements regarding the funding and
hiring practices met the initial requirement that the "speech in question
involve[d] a matter of public concern.' Utilizing the Pickering balanc-
99. Id. at 1213.







107. Id. at 1215.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1218.
110. Id. at 1218-19.
111. Id. at 1219.
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ing test, 112 the court found that Baca's interest in making his statements
outweighed the university's interest in regulating Baca's speech."13
The court then turned to the third element: whether Baca's "pro-
tected speech substantially motivated CIPRE to take adverse employ-
ment actions against him."'" 4 The court began by discussing whether the
discipline constituted an adverse employment action. The court stated,
"[a]lthough we have never delineated what actions constitute 'adverse
employment actions' in the First Amendment context, we have repeat-
edly concluded that a public employer can violate an employee's First
Amendment rights by subjecting an employee to repercussions that
would not be actionable under Title VII.' '5
The court noted that actions short of constructive or actual employ-
ment decisions, such as employee reprimands, transfers, and the removal
of job duties, could be adverse employment actions in instances of First
Amendment retaliation. 1 6 The court commented that if Baca's allega-
tions of university improprieties were true, then those actions could be
adverse. "17
The court then discussed whether Baca's protected speech "substan-
tially motivated the employer to administer such adverse conse-
quences."' 1 8 Consequently the court held that Baca had raised a suffi-
cient issue of material fact regarding Sklar's motivation to survive sum-
mary judgment." 9 As such, the court reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the defendants and remanded the case. 1
20
B. Maestas v. Segura
12
1. Case
Plaintiff Bennie Maestas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that David Segura and Dennis Pratt, in their official capacities, retaliated
against him "for speaking out on matters of public concern in violation of
the First Amendment."' 122 The district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment holding that Maestas had met the first three
112. See supra Part 1.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1220.
115. Id. (citing Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434, 1437 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990);
Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999)).
116. Id. (citing Schuler, 189 F.3d at 1310).
117. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1221 (enumerating Baca's assertions of the removal of supervisory
authority, procedural discrepancies, and the filing of unfounded employment investigations as feasi-
bly adverse).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1222.
120. Id.
121. 416 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2005).
122. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1182.
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elements of the prima facie case but it "ultimately concluded Defendants
would have reached the same decision absent Plaintiff's speech."',
23
Maestas began employment with the City of Albuquerque in 1987,
and in 1994 became "material manager" at the Vehicle Maintenance De-
partment (VMD), a division of the Solid Waste Management Department
(SWMD).124 Over the next several years Maestas repeatedly complained
to the city and local media about deficiencies within the SWMD.2 5
Thereafter, reports and internal audits revealed improprieties within the
department including verification of Maestas' concerns.
26
Throughout the next couple of years, Maestas continued to com-
plain about department protocol. 27 In 2001 and 2002 the city mayor
required every department to make budget cuts. 28 In April 2002, Maes-
tas was informed of the City's proposal to cut his position. 129 Maestas
was reassigned to SWMD's Central Service Division (CSD) and his pre-
vious position at VMD was left vacant.1 30 At CSD Maestas "retained the
same salary, benefits, and job title.",
131
2. Decision
Judge Baldock began his analysis with an exhortation to govern-
ment employers that they may not "as a condition of employment, com-
pel an employee to relinquish carte blanche his First Amendment right to
comment on matters of public concern."' 32 The judge then set forth the
prima facie case for First Amendment retaliation claims. The employee
must establish that the speech was a matter of public concern, the em-
ployee's interest in voicing the speech must outweigh the employer's
interest in regulating it, and "the speech [must be] ... a 'substantial mo-
tivating factor' behind the employer's decision to take an adverse em-
ployment action against the employee."' 33 The court analyzed the third
element by placing the adverse employment discussion in a lengthy foot-
note and concentrating on the substantial motivating factor.
34
Within the footnote, the court discussed the circuit split regarding
what constitutes adverse actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims. 35 The court referenced Baca, stating that some retaliation may
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1184.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1185.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1186.
130. Id. at 1185.
131. Id. at 1187.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1188 n.5.
135. Id.
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be actionable under § 1983 and the First Amendment, though not under
Title VII. 3 6 Addressing the actionable range of adverse procedures, the
court stated that employment decisions that do not amount to termination
or dismissal could be adverse.1 37 However, the court was quick to men-
tion that the Tenth Circuit has "never held employment actions which
may tend to chill free speech [as] necessarily adverse." 138 Additionally,
the court refused to determine if Maestas' transfer constituted an adverse
employment action: "[g]iven our conclusion that Plaintiffs' speech was
not a substantial motivating factor ... we continue to leave that question
[whether a chilling effect on free speech is an adverse employment ac-
tion] for another day."'
' 39
The court then took considerable time in explaining its stance on the
substantial motivating factor.140 The court concluded that Maestas failed
to establish a link between his speech and Segura's decision to transfer
him to CSD. 14' The court held that Maestas failed to establish a prima
facie case and the court affirmed the district court's judgment.1
42
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Briscoe disagreed with the court's analysis of
adverse employment actions in Tenth Circuit First Amendment retalia-
tion claims.143  Judge Briscoe argued that the court already held that
those actions which tend to chill free speech are adverse.'"a Referencing
Belcher v. City of McAlester, 145 the judge stated that the court already
applied the Seventh Circuit's "chilling effect" to Tenth Circuit adverse
employment jurisprudence. 1
46
IV. ANALYSIS-HIGH PRESSURE DISSIPATING, GRAY SKIES
COMPROMISING, AND CHILLS RISING
The Tenth Circuit should adopt the approach asserted by the Ninth,
Seventh, and Fourth Circuits which hold that actions which have a "chill-






140. Id. at 1188-89. "what constitutes a substantial motivating factor evades precise defini-
tion." Id. at 1188. However, the court stated that it was something less than "but-for" causation or
the sole reason for the employer's action, but more than mere speculation or "hunches amidst rumor
and innuendo." Id. at 1188-89.
141. Id. at 1189.
142. Id. at 1192.
143. Id. at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. 324 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2003).
146. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
147. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003); Power v. Summers,
226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2000); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d
337, 352 (4th Cir. 2000).
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While each standard for interpreting adverse employment actions has
advantages, the "chilling effect" approach rises above the rest because it
effectively advances employee protection in First Amendment retaliation
claims. The Title VII standard held by the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth
Circuits attempts to dam the proverbial flood of litigation but its statutory
status is not the proper measure for interpreting a constitutional claim. In
addition, the "individual of ordinary firmness" approach is appealing for
its compromising nature but its application varies among the Second,
Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits.
Subsections A and B below expand on the reasoning behind the au-
thor's assertion that the Title VII and the "individual of ordinary firm-
ness" interpretations should not be utilized in the Tenth Circuit. In Sub-
section C, the author argues for the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the
"chilling effect" approach to interpreting adverse employment actions in
First Amendment retaliation claims.
A. Title VlI's High Pressure System
The First Amendment retaliation adverse employment action ap-
proach held by the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits derives from Title
VII retaliation claims. 48  These circuits restrict adverse employment
actions to significant alterations of the conditions of employment
amounting to a material or tangible change.149 There are three reasons
why the Title VII approach to adverse employment actions should not be
utilized by the Tenth Circuit in First Amendment retaliation claims.
First, the Supreme Court's precedent in these claims broadly protects
public employees' free speech. Second, the Circuits which utilize the
"ultimate employment decision" standard in First Amendment retaliation
claims are applying an interpretation which is flawed in its original ap-
plication to Title VII. Third and finally, the statutory Title VII approach
to retaliation claims should not be used to interpret constitutional First
Amendment claims.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that it will protect
an employee's freedom of speech, "absent strong countervailing inter-
ests."' 50 Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education'' the Court
has consistently held that First Amendment rights are paramount and that
the employer ultimately has the burden to prove that his actions were not
retaliatory.' 52 An adoption of the Title VII approach to interpreting ad-
148. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687.
149. Id. at 674.
150. Id. at 692.
151. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
152. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 678-80.
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verse employment actions is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
broad protection of employee's rights.
153
2. The "Ultimate Employment Decision" Interpretation
The circuits which adopt the "ultimate employment decision" inter-
pretation of adverse employment action in Title VII claims are adopting
an approach which disproportionately favors employers who retaliate
against their employees. 154 This approach is flawed in its application to
Title VII and should not be imposed on employees with First Amend-
ment retaliation claims, thereby promoting the initial error. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) Compliance Manual,
which has not been adopted by all the circuits, broadly construes Title
VII retaliation claims.155 Contrary to the interpretation held by the Elev-
enth, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits, the EEOC states that "[t]he statutory
retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a re-
taliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or
others from engaging in protected activity."' 56  The EEOC explicitly
states that it does not agree with the circuits that require ultimate em-
ployment decisions to prove the adverse employment action prong of
retaliation claims. 157 Conversely, the agency believes that this interpreta-
tion undermines the effectiveness of employment statutes and harms the
public "by deterring others from filing a charge."'
5 8
The circuits which adhere to the "ultimate employment action" ap-
proach limit the remedies available to employees that are retaliated
against and adopt a flawed view of adverse employment actions. 59 It is
important for the Tenth Circuit to refuse to apply this defective approach
to adverse employment action interpretation in both the Title VII and
First Amendment retaliation contexts. While discrimination is an evil
unto itself, an infringement on the ability to exercise one's constitutional
right to free speech is an infringement on an essential aspect of American
153. See infra Part IV.C.I (discussing the Supreme Court's recent cases expanding employee
protection in First Amendment retaliation claims).
154. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits utilize the "ultimate employment decisions" standard requir-
ing an adverse action relating to hiring, discharging, granting leave, promoting and wage adjust-
ments for the employee to succeed in a Title VII retaliation claim. See Mattem v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Davis v. KARK-TV Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 706 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that only tangible changes in working conditions such as termination or reduced pay consti-
tute adverse employment actions in Title VII retaliation claims).
155. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Compliance Manual § 8-II(D)(3)
(1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf. The Tenth Circuit has already adopted a broader
interpretation of adverse employment actions in Title VII retaliation claims and has refused to apply
the narrow approach to First Amendment retaliation claims. See Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182,
1188 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005).




159. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687-88.
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democracy. 60  In furtherance of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
adverse employment actions, this strict approach should be avoided when
constitutional rights are at stake.' 
6'
3. Standards for Constitutional Claims
The statutory text of Title VII should not be used when deciding
claims arising under the constitutional protection of the First Amend-
ment.1 62 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit asserts that First Amend-
ment retaliation claims should not be measured or interpreted by the
statutory provisions of Title VII. 163  Retaliation suits brought under §
1983 are not comparable to discriminatory retaliation suits brought under
Title VII.164 According to Judge Posner, Title VII forbids "invidious
discrimination in employment" and limits "protection to victims of 'ad-
verse employment action,' which is judicial shorthand (the term does not
appear in the statutes themselves) for the fact that these statutes require
the plaintiff to prove that the employer's action ... altered the terms or
conditions of his employment.'
165
No such limitation is required in § 1983 or the constitutional provi-
sions it enforces. 166 Indeed, § 1983 does not necessitate that the claim
arise in an employment context. 67 It only demands that a deprivation
occur "under color of law" and "is likely to deter the exercise of free
speech" or any other constitutional deprivation which is claimed.
68
Unlike Title VII, § 1983 creates government liability when the govern-
ment deprives a person of his or her constitutional rights. 169 The context
and content of Title VII and § 1983 constitutional deprivation claims are
so dramatically different it is incorrect to use the one (Title VII) to inter-
pret the other (§ 1983).
4. Summary-Title VII Interpretation
These three reasons establish why Title VII adverse employment ac-
tion interpretation should not be applied to First Amendment retaliation
160. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
161. On December 5, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797 (2005), in which it will decide what type of adverse
employment action a plaintiff must establish to support a Title VII retaliation claim. This case has
far reaching implications in the Title VII and First Amendment retaliation contexts because of the
"ultimate employment decision" standard's application to both causes of action. If the strict stan-
dard is rejected by the Supreme Court, the circuits which apply it to Title VII, and First Amendment
retaliation claims will have to adopt a less stringent test.
162. Levinson, supra note 23, at 676.
163. Spiegla v. Major Eddie Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir. 2004).
164. Power, 226 F.3d at 820.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Harvey Brown and Sarah Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Vehicle For Protecting Public
Employees' Constitutional Rights, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 619, 622 (1995).
168. Power, 226 F.3d at 820. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
169. Love, supra note 1, at 31.
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claims. However, even if the standard were adopted by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the court's Title VII retaliation jurisprudence would not require
strict adherence to the "material" or "significant alteration of employ-
ment conditions" interpretation.
1 70
In the unlikely event that the Tenth Circuit adopts the Title VII in-
terpretation, the court already holds a broad interpretation of adverse
employment action, liberally construing each action on a case-by-case
basis.' 7' Generally, the Tenth Circuit holds that those employer actions
which do "not rise to the level of ultimate employment decisions such as
discharge, demotion, or failure to hire, may be actionable."' 72 The Tenth
Circuit's case-by-case approach is much less threatening than its coun-
terparts' interpretation in the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits.
173
Adherence to the Title VII approach may not be severely detrimen-
tal to Tenth Circuit public employees; however, applying this strict Title
VII approach to First Amendment retaliation claims may have far-
reaching implications. 174 A decision to further restrain the now liberally
construed adverse employment action factor in the Title VII context
could deter free speech if applied to First Amendment retaliation
claims. 175 However, the Tenth Circuit will not likely adopt this position.
As they stated in Baca, "we have repeatedly concluded that a public em-
ployer can violate First Amendment rights by subjecting an employee to
repercussions that would not be actionable under Title VII.'
176
B. Weak Gray Skies of the Individual of Ordinary Firmness
The "individual of ordinary firmness" standard in First Amendment
retaliation claims, though appealing as the middle ground between the
strict standard of Title VII and the broader "chilling effect" interpreta-
tion, is too fickle an approach to be adopted by the Tenth Circuit.
While the "individual of ordinary firmness" is a "sensible stan-
dard,"' 77 the interpretation varies from circuit to circuit, creating uncer-
170. Caplinger, supra note 8, at 27.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra Part II.A (discussing the circuits' adherence to a strict "materially adverse"
interpretation of what constitutes an adverse employment action).
174. See Caplinger, supra note 8, at 20 (asserting that there has been a steady increase of
retaliation claims in the past decade possibly stemming from the ease of surviving summary judg-
ment in Title VII retaliation claims as opposed to Title VII discrimination claims).
175. See Tran v. Trustees of the State Colleges in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2004).
This case discussed the Supreme Court's definition of adverse employment action in Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). The court held that the "tangible employment
action" is the standard in the 10th Circuit for purposes of Title VII retaliation claims, perhaps imply-
ing a move in a more restrictive direction. See also Caplinger, supra note 8, at 28.
176. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 2005).
177. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also Love, supra note 1,
at 31 (explaining the D.C. Circuit's approval of the district court's holding in Crawford-El which
stood for the proposition that the person of ordinary firmness was a "sensible standard," which was
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tainty for public employees and employers. 178 For instance, the Second
Circuit, in Deters v. Lafuente, 179 required the "combination of seemingly
minor incidents to form the basis of a constitutional retaliation claim...
[to] reach a critical mass" in retaliation claims based on a hostile work
environment.18 0 Those incidents which are minor and infrequent, though
retaliatory, are not considered deterrent to the "individual of ordinary
firmness" in the Second Circuit.'
18
For example, in Deters, two police officers were subject to depart-
ment disciplinary proceedings after being acquitted of criminal assault
charges. 82 The employees asserted that several hostile and retaliatory
actions were taken against them, including false accusations of failure to
respond and playing games on the police radio, as well as failure to pro-
mote. 183 However, "[l]ooking at plaintiffs' hostile environment allega-
tions in the most favorable light," the court held "that [the allegations]
[weire insufficient to raise a constitutional claim of retaliation.''
184
Conversely, in the Third Circuit case of Suppan v. Dadonna,I8 5 po-
lice officers were subject to a variety of similar retaliatory actions includ-
ing questionable employee "rankings and the failure to promote."' 8 6 The
court held that this retaliatory conduct was enough to deter an individual
of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights in the
future. 187 In contrast to the Second Circuit's similarly worded standard,
the Third Circuit's "individual of ordinary firmness" seems weak.
The discrepancy between circuits which hold the same standard ex-
emplifies the ambiguity of the term and the feeble nature of this com-
promise between the Title VII and "chilling effect" interpretations. Ad-
ditionally, the Second Circuit's need for a "critical mass" of actions
while "understandable to ensure that minor incidents of retaliation do not
flood the courts, deviates from the core question" of deterrence of free
speech and weakens the conciliatory nature of the approach.18 8  While
this interpretation of adverse employment action, held by the Second,
Third, Sixth and D.C. Circuits, allows employees a greater breadth of
actionable claims, it does not provide public sector employees with the
subsequently left alone by the Supreme Court). Crawford-El, 951 F.2d at 1322, vacated and re-
manded en banc, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 747 (1998).
178. See Levinson, supra note 23, at 691; Love, supra note 1, at 31.
179. 368 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2004).
180. Deters, 368 F.3d at 189 (quoting Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)).
181. Deters, 368 F.3d at 189.
182. Id. at 186.
183. Id. at 187.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. 203 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2000).
186. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234.
187. Id. at 235.
188. Levinson, supra note 23, at 692.
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"sensibility" it purports and therefore should not be adopted by the Tenth
Circuit.
C. "Chilling Effect" Cools Retaliation and the Tenth Circuit
The Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits have adopted the broadest
interpretation of First Amendment retaliation adverse employment ac-
tions.189 While the Title VII and "individual of ordinary firmness" inter-
pretations may serve the "laudable goal of filtering out insubstantial
claims," the "chilling effect" approach most effectively protects First
Amendment rights.' 90 The Supreme Court has held that First Amend-
ment retaliation claims must stop "the government, except in the most
compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its
employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not
associate."' 91 By decisively embracing the "chilling effect" approach,
the Tenth Circuit will further restrain public employers from retaliating
against employees who exercise their constitutionally ordained rights.
Adoption of the "chilling effect" approach is proper because this in-
terpretation protects employees who suffer discrete actions which in-
fringe on their constitutional rights. Additionally, both the Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit are already embracing a broader protection
of employees' rights in this context. 192 Finally, the protection of public
employees' speech benefits both the employees and the American public
at large.
The "chilling effect" interpretation of adverse employment actions
protects public employees where "any deprivation that is likely to deter
the exercise of free speech" occurs. 193 Thus, "a government act of re-
taliation need not be severe and it need not be of a certain kind.' ' 194 Per-
haps as a result of the constitutional deprivation, the actions do not have
to be great to be adverse; the slightest wariness to speak freely may be
enough.' 9 By their nature, demotions and discharges are adverse actions
if based upon an employee's protected speech. 196 However, "the courts'
limits on what counts as an [adverse action] have the effect of enabling
sophisticated government supervisors to keep their employees in line
189. See supra Part I1.C (discussing the "chilling effect" standard adopted in these three cir-
cuits).
190. Wells, supra note 94, at 972.
191. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990).
192. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76; Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996);
United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995); Belcher v. City of
McAlester, 324 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003); Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304, 1308
(I0th Cir. 1999).
193. Levinson, supra note 23, at 699.
194. Section 1983 First Amendment Claims, 5 EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 1:16
(2005).
195. Love, supra note 1, at 3 1.
196. MARCY EDWARDS, ET AL., FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE 91 (1998).
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without risking the loss of a lawsuit."' 197 Retaliatory acts need not be
monstrous but must create the potential to chill an employee's speech.1
98
"A campaign of petty harassment may achieve the same effect as an ex-
plicit punishment" and therefore chill free speech. 199 According to the
Seventh circuit, even a small effect-a chill--on freedom of speech can
be actionable because there is no justification for harassing people for
exercising their constitutional rights.2 °0
Additionally, the Supreme Court utilizes the lower courts' "chilling
effect" adverse employment action standard. This positively chilling
trend was acclaimed in Rutan and further expanded in two decisive
cases.
20 1
1. The Supreme Court's Positively Chilling Front
The Supreme Court's expansion of First Amendment retaliation
claims indicates the Court's desire to broadly protect individuals. In
several politically charged cases regarding party patronage, public em-
ployee honoraria, and government contracting, the Supreme Court has
liberally protected public employees' free speech.20 2 It is likely the Su-
preme Court will fully embrace the "chilling effect" approach in the fu-
ture, as evidenced by its expansion of public employees' First Amend-
ment rights under § 1983. Following the Supreme Court's lead, the
Tenth Circuit should adopt the "chilling effect" approach to adverse em-
ployment action interpretation and secure free speech rights for govern-
ment employees.
a. Rutan
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Rutan, a case involving the
constitutionality of adverse employment actions based on a public em-
ployee's party affiliation.2 3 In holding that political patronage practices
such as promotion, transfer, layoff recall, and hiring could be adverse if
improperly directed at non-affiliated parties, the Supreme Court further
protected employees from actions effected to deter their free speech.2°
The Court soundly rejected the respondents' assertion that because the
197. Wells, supra note 94, at 973.
198. Levinson, supra note 23, at 699.
199. Id. (quoting Walsh v. Ward, 991 F.2d 1344, 1345 (7th Cir. 1993)).
200. Ban v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982).
201. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 75; See also Levinson, supra note 23, at 682-87.
202. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64; Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668
(1996).
203. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64. In Rutan, the governor of Illinois issued a hiring freeze on several
departments under his control. Id. at 65. No exceptions were allowed without the express consent of
the Governor. Id. According to the petitioners, the Governor utilized the freeze to benefit those
individuals loyal to the Republican party. Id at 66. As a result, petitioners argued that they were
denied promotions, transfers to locations nearer to home, and recalls after layoffs. Id. at 67. See also
Nancy Oxfeld, Free Speech for Public Employees: Justice Holmes Had It Wrong, 45 KAN. L. REV.
1299, 1310 (1997).
204. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64.
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actions were not punitive they could not "chill the exercise of protected
belief and association by public employees. 20 5
The Court held that "[e]mployees who find themselves in dead end
positions because of their political backgrounds are adversely af-
fected., 20 6 The Court found that if an employee feels obligated to asso-
ciate with the party in power his First Amendment right to affiliate with
whichever political party he prefers is impermissibly infringed.20 7 By
being denied transfers or being laid off, an employee may feel compelled
to change patronage, thereby being deprived a constitutionally protected
freedom. 208 In turn, the Court increased the depth of First Amendment
retaliation claims and furthered the noble goal of protecting public em-
ployees' rights.
b. National Treasury v. Treasury Employees Union
209
Several years later the Supreme Court continued its course and
struck down a federal employee honoraria ban because it infringed on a
public employee's speech. 210  The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 banned
public employees of all three branches from receiving honoraria for any
speech, appearance, or article. 21 1 In National Treasury v. Treasury Em-
ployees Union, the Court "recognized that preventing compensation for
speech may deter, and thus infringe on, protected speech rights."
212
Here, the Court expanded the "chilling effect" recognized in Rutan.
"Unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, this ban
chills potential speech before it happens. 21 3  The restraint of speech,
appearance, or written word imposes such a serious burden on the pub-
lic's right to read and hear and the employee's right to express that it
"abridges speech under the First Amendment." 214 Acknowledgment that
the ban chilled potential speech further solidified the Court's desire to
protect public employee speech without evidence of a significant, nar-
rowly-tailored government interest.
215




209. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
210. Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 457.
211. Id. at 459-460.
212. Id. at 466-67.
213. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 470.
215. See Ian H. Morrison, The Case for Minimal Regulation of Pubic Employee Free Speech: A
Critical Analysis of the Federal Honoraria Ban Controversy, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. CONTEMP. L.
141,164-65 (1995).
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c. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr
216
Finally, in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, a case ac-
cepted from the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court established that em-
ployees contracted by the government are protected against adverse ac-
tions resulting from First Amendment retaliation.217  The Court again
utilized the "chilling effect" language regarding adverse employment
actions.218 "As in Rutan, the Supreme Court focused on whether certain
government conduct chilled speech, not on whether the adverse action
could be characterized as a material or substantial employment ac-
tion.
''219
Citing several precedential cases, the Court held that "constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of govern-
mental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise
of First Amendment rights., 220 The Court determined that a bright line
rule distinguishing government contractors from employees would "give
the government carte blanche to terminate independent contractors for
exercising First Amendment rights.",22' The Court firmly established its
support for the "chilling effect" approach to adverse actions in First
Amendment retaliation claims by holding that contractors' First
Amendment rights should be protected.222 Once again the Court found
that "[t]he threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill
speech on matters of public concern" was enough to constitute an ad-
verse employment action in First Amendment retaliation claims.223
In light of Rutan, National Treasury, and Umbehr, the Tenth Circuit
should follow the Supreme Court's lead, adopt the "chilling effect" stan-
dard and broadly protect public employees' speech in First Amendment
retaliation claims.
2. Chilly Air Covers the Tenth Circuit
At the heart of the argument in favor of adopting the "chilling ef-
fect" standard is the Tenth Circuit's own utilization of the "chilling ef-
fect" language, its willingness to reject the Title VII approach,224 and its
expansion of the actions it deems adverse. In several cases, including
216. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
217. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673.
218. Id. at 674.
219. Levinson, supra note 23, at 685 (citing Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674-76).
220. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (alteration in original) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11
(1972)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
221. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 679.
222. See Levinson, supra note 23, at 685.
223. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,674 (1994)).
224. See supra Part V.A.
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Baca, the court expanded protection of public employees' free speech
rights and inched towards embracing the "chilling effect" approach.22 5
First, the Tenth Circuit has previously used the "chilling effect" lan-
22627guage. For example, in Belcher v. City of McAlester,227 the plaintiff
suffered adverse actions when he received a written reprimand for con-
tacting city councilmen without following procedure.2 8  Additionally,
the plaintiff was told that more procedural violations would result in se-
vere disciplinary action which could include dismissal.229  The court
found that: "[i]n reprimanding Belcher, the fire department chilled any
future attempts to contact Council members outside of a public meeting.
We conclude that this chilling effect is real, and that Belcher has shown
that he was subject to adverse employment action as a result of his
speech. 2 30 The court's own use of the "chilling effect" language implies
that at least three of the circuit court judges are in favor of adopting this
approach.
In addition to express use of the language, the court has broadened
its protection of public employees by finding many actions less severe
than dismissal as adverse. In Baca, the court found that, if true, the re-
moval of some supervisory authority, reprimands outside of procedure,
and the filing of an unfounded employment charge constituted an adverse
employment action.2 3' These actions do not constitute significant em-
ployment decisions, and yet the court found them adverse.
Similarly, in Schuler v. City of Boulder,232 the court found that the
removal of job duties, a written reprimand, a low evaluation score, and
an involuntary lateral transfer constituted an adverse employment action
in First Amendment retaliation claims.233  Additionally, the court
strengthened employee protection by finding that Schuler's subsequent
enjoyment of her new position did not matter in light of the retaliatory
234actions. Relying on Rutan the court stated its desire to protect em-
ployees from those "deprivations less harsh than dismissal which never-
theless violated a public employee's rights under the First Amend-
ment.
235
In Maestas, and in direct contrast to Judge Baldock's stated that the
court had not yet decided on the matter, Judge Briscoe asserted that the
225. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005); Belcher v. City of McAlester, 324 F.3d
1203 (10th Cir. 2003); Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1999).
226. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
227. 324 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2003)
228. Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1205.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1207 n.4 (emphasis added).
231. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1221.
232. 189 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1999).
233. Schuler, 189 F.3d at 1310.
234. Id. at 1310 n.3.
235. Id. at 1309.
[Vol. 83:3
FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIMS
Tenth Circuit has already adopted the "chilling effect" approach.236
While the honorable judges may disagree, it is now time for the court to
firmly decide the issue and embrace the "chilling effect" approach to
adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation claims.
Subsequent to the rulings in Baca, Belcher, and Schuler the court should
follow the protectionist lead of the Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits
and adopt the "chilling effect" interpretation.
3. Chilling Climate Benefits Public
Finally, the Tenth Circuit should embrace the "chilling effect" ap-
proach to interpreting adverse employment actions in First Amendment
retaliation claims because it benefits both employees and the public at
large. By broadly interpreting this element, the general public will be in
a superior position to make intelligent decisions while voting on issues
and electing officials.237 Public employees have unique access to infor-
mation not readily available to the public as a whole. Society does not
benefit when government employers retaliate against their employees for
speaking out on matters affecting the public. Above all, government
employees are "often in the best position to know what ails the agencies
for which they work.,
238
For example, the employee in Baca was exercising his First Amend-
ment rights when he spoke against alleged fiscal and hiring improprieties
within the state university system.239 Without the ability to speak freely
about these matters, employees like Baca will not be able to inform the
public of government abuses. Government employees have unique ac-
cess to information regarding the inner workings of the democratic sys-
tem and their ability to speak on these matters should not be infringed
upon for fear of retaliation.240 Additionally, the public employee already
has a high threshold to meet because Pickering and Mt. Healthy estab-
lished that the matter spoken on must be of public concern. 24' By em-
bracing a broad interpretation of what constitutes an adverse employment
action in First Amendment retaliation claims the Tenth Circuit will fur-
ther protect this "bedrock of American democracy. 242 The court has an
obligation to protect the public and safeguard "the public's right to re-
ceive critical information" by embracing the "chilling effect" approach to
interpreting adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims.243
236. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
237. Love, supra note 1, at 32.
238. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (citing Waters, 511 U.S. at 674).
239. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1217-20.
240. Levinson, supra note 23, at 693.
241. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
242. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
243. Levinson, supra note 23, at 693.
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CONCLUSION
Retaliation against public employees for exercising their First
Amendment right to comment on matters of public concern is unaccept-
able. The Tenth Circuit should not condone retaliatory acts by refusing
to adopt the "chilling effect" approach to adverse employment action
interpretation. The First Amendment retaliation claim has three elements
which protect government employers from unfounded actions against
them.244 The employee must establish that "(1) the speech involved a
matter of public concern, (2) the employee's interest in engaging in the
speech outweighed the employer's interest in regulating the speech, and
(3) the speech was a 'substantial motivating factor' behind the em-
ployer's decision to take an adverse employment action against the em-
ployee., 245 By adopting the broad "chilling effect" approach to interpret-
ing this third factor, the Tenth Circuit will insure the protection of the
public employee's constitutional right to free speech. In turn, actions
which are "intended to punish" an employee for free speech on issues of
public interest will not be tolerated if the court adopts the "chilling ef-
fect" standard.246 Additionally, both the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit utilize the "chilling effect" language which provides support for
its wholehearted adoption in the Tenth Circuit. Finally, a broader inter-
pretation of adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims benefits government employees and the public at large. By ac-
cepting the "chilling effect" approach to interpreting adverse employ-
ment actions the court will protect employees from retaliation and give
the public access to "an unequalled source of information concerning
public matters." 247 The Tenth Circuit must join the Ninth, Seventh, and
Fourth Circuits and embrace the "chilling effect" approach to interpret-
ing adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation claims.
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244. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005).
245. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1187.
246. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76 n.8.
247. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
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